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decades. Worldwide, there are at 
least nine different populations 
based on song differences. In the 
North Pacific, there are distinct 
Northeast and Northwest Pacific 
song types. Some of these whales 
are able to hear each other’s songs 
in the central Pacific where more 
than one song can be recorded in 
the same area. It is unclear whether 
animals using different song types in 
the central Pacific breed with each 
other, but animals in the western 
and eastern North Pacific do not 
use the song of the other population 
and concurrent recordings of both 
types in the central Pacific are not 
very common. It remains to be seen 
whether some blue whales in the 
central Pacific have learned to use 
both song types or whether animals 
just keep the song identified from 
their population for life. Given the 
distribution of blue whales and the 
geographic and temporal variation 
of song types, it appears that vocal 
learning does not come into play. 
As in many cases with animals that 
cannot be studied in the laboratory, 
further data are needed to draw such 
conclusions with confidence.
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The term ‘imitation’ has a range 
of meanings in everyday usage 
and no single agreed definition in 
science. In biology, imitation has 
usually referred to morphological 
adaptations for camouflage or 
mimicking the appearance of another 
species (Figure 1). Only recently 
has there been intense interest 
in the imitation of behaviour by 
animals; animal learning theory has 
traditionally ignored imitation. One 
purpose of this Primer is to help 
explain why researchers do now care 
about animal imitation; another is 
to chart the various kinds of action 
imitation that may be important for 
biology and illustrate the sometimes 
confusing array of terms that have 
been coined to describe them. 
Among the variety of definitions of 
‘imitate’ found in English dictionaries, 
three quite distinct senses are 
generally apparent. All three have 
biological equivalents in the adaptive 
functions served by animal imitation, 
and I shall use these as a structure 
to understand what cognitive 
mechanisms are required for the 
different forms of imitation. 
Aiming to resemble
One objective of imitation in 
everyday life is to resemble as 
closely as possible the individual 
whose behaviour is copied, usually 
because their behaviour is judged to 
be admirable or because the imitator 
wishes to be seen as like them in 
some key ways (“imitation is the 
sincerest form of flattery”). There 
are several circumstances in which 
animal imitation of this sort might be 
adaptive; most are cases where the 
imitation is immediate and the result 
is behavioural synchrony.
Predators are thought to target 
individuals that stand out in some 
way, so behaving just like other 
members of a flock or herd may 
reduce risk. A general tendency 
to match the current actions of 
others, when in a group, might 
therefore be expected to evolve 
in social species. Moreover, by 
copying the current behaviour of 
Primer other group members, individuals of social species can potentially 
gain from others’ knowledge of a 
range of costs and benefits that are 
associated with place, including 
local level of predation risk, locations 
of optimal feeding sites, and what 
is edible there. Note that these 
gains come automatically from 
behavioural matching, not as a result 
of knowledge transfer.
Behavioural synchrony is in 
fact reported in a wide range of 
social animals, and extends to a 
detailed level of activity copying, 
such as preening together [1], or 
the nearly simultaneous turning 
of each individual in a flying flock 
of shorebirds that generates such 
spectacular aerial acrobatics. 
In some instances, the adaptive 
function of behaviour matching is 
less obvious. Contagious yawning 
is found in chimpanzees as well as 
humans, and the synchrony appears 
to involve arousal level as well as 
overt activity: one possibility is 
that synchronization of sleeping is 
adaptive, or was in human ancestry. 
Human yawning is also contagious to 
dogs, but it is not yet known whether 
dogs affect each other in this way: 
in a long-domesticated species, the 
function may instead relate to how 
dogs mesh with human behaviour. 
Cognitively, imitation that 
produces immediate behavioural 
synchrony requires an individual to 
recognize specific actions in others’ 
behaviour that are already in its own 
repertoire. This sort of copying may 
be understood simply as response 
facilitation, where seeing an action 
‘primes’ the individual to do the same 
[2,3]. No special mechanisms are 
required to understand performance 
of the action, as no new behaviour is 
added to the individual’s repertoire. 
Conveying a social message
A different kind of imitation is when 
the copying itself conveys a social 
signal. Postural mimicry, in which 
two people who like or love each 
other quite unconsciously adopt 
the same or a mirror image of body 
posture has long been noted by 
social psychologists. Very young, 
even new-born infants copy the 
facial gestures of adults interacting 
with them, for instance smiling or 
tongue-protrusion [4]. This ‘neonatal 
imitation’ may increase maternal 
investment in the child by signalling 
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competence, and has also been 
described in chimpanzees. Adult 
humans use imitation of actions to 
signal that a social connection has 
been made, for instance returning 
a wave. Many greeting signals 
and ceremonies of animals might 
be thought of as imitation of this 
kind, but since these actions are 
stereotyped they may simply be 
evoked by the social circumstances. 
Although monkeys have been 
described as unable to imitate, when 
their actions are instantly copied 
by human experimenters they react 
strikingly, suggesting signalling 
social connection by imitating is 
part of the natural communicative 
repertoire of monkeys. 
People also use mimicry to mock 
or deride others, as in the cruel 
mimicry of schoolchildren and in 
sophisticated satire. The capacity to 
derive pleasure from manipulating 
the feelings of others implies a rich 
understanding of mental states 
[5]. Intriguingly, chimpanzees at 
the Burger’s Zoo, Arnhem, have 
been seen to imitate the limp of a 
disabled group member. However, 
wild chimpanzees at several sites 
suffer high frequencies of disability 
from snare injuries, yet no similar 
mimicry has ever been noted. 
Rather than enjoying cruelty, it may 
be that the Arnhem chimpanzees 
were influenced by a general ape 
tendency to behavioural synchrony 
and the suffering of the mimicked 
individual was incidental; ascribing 
understanding of complex mental 
states may be unwarranted. 
In all these cases, any social 
message conveyed is an immediate 
one, but humans also show a sort 
of imitation when they converge on 
the behavioural norms of their social 
group, conveying the message of 
group membership — and conversely, 
out-group exclusion. Conformity to 
group norms of behaviour has long 
been studied in social psychology. 
In chimpanzees and rats, a general 
tendency to conform to the actions 
of the majority of the group has 
also been reported and described 
as conformity. Individuals that 
have already discovered how to 
open a puzzle box satisfactorily 
(chimpanzees), or found a food that 
is palatable (rats), switched to the 
actions and choices of the majority. 
In these experiments conformity 
was valueless, but the behaviour 
may be a by-product of a trait that 
functions in reducing exposure to 
risk in unpredictable environments. 
Certainly, both chimpanzees and rats 
have been noted as conservative 
in behaviour, for instance being 
remarkably cautious about trying 
novel foods. A similar explanation 
may apply to the short-lasting ‘fads’ 
shown by young gorillas, such as 
the once-popular habit of pushing 
through the legs of researchers rather 
than walking around them. Finding 
behavioural conformity among our 
closest relatives, the great apes, 
it is tempting to presume that its 
function might relate to a sense of 
group identity, as in humans. Male 
chimpanzees certainly show violence 
to members of other communities 
in a way that is disturbingly human. 
However, there is no indication that 
intercommunity violence is predicated 
on non-conformity, arguing against 
such a rich interpretation.
The cognitive mechanism of 
imitation when used as a social 
signal is likely to vary with the actions 
copied and the motivation to do so [2]. 
Where the actions are ‘transparent’, 
that is, they look much the same 
from the perspective of mimic and 
model, then priming or facilitation 
of specific actions may be all that is 
required, as in the previous category. 
With neonatal imitation, however, the 
action copied is wholly opaque and 
any explanation will require an innate 
system that matches observed facial 
gestures with the motor commands 
needed to imitate them. It is difficult 
to determine how extensive a set of 
correspondences might exist, when 
the neonate has such a limited motor 
repertoire; theorists range from those 
who attribute hard-wired matching 
of just a few key facial gestures to 
those who posit in the infant the 
ability to match 1:1 the complete 
motor repertoire [4]. Where lasting 
consistency is seen, a tendency to 
conform is additionally required. This 
can override what has been learnt 
from individual experience; and the 
bias to social learning is frequency-
dependent, more potent if more 
individuals are showing the same 
actions.
Following the example
Learning how to do something 
from seeing it done might seem the 
most obvious sense of imitation, 
yet scientific interpretations of it 
have varied from a cheap monkey 
trick to an exalted pinnacle of 
animal cognition. Even now, it is 
unclear which species of animal 
have the ability to learn by imitation. 
Partly this relates to semantic 
confusion, between learning by 
imitation and learning that follows 
from imitation. As we have noted 
already, the tendency to copy the 
actions of nearby conspecifics 
occurs widely among animals and 
can be straightforwardly explained 
in most cases as a result of priming 
those responses that match actions 
seen. Where animals are engaged in 
instrumental activity, this behaviour-
matching tendency may result in a 
naïve individual applying actions that 
Figure 1. Sombre bee orchid (Ophrys fusca). 
Imitation is widespread in biology, but usually 
the copy results from morphological adapta-
tion. The flower of each Ophrys orchid spe-
cies imitates the appearance and pheromo-
nal signal of a particular species of insect, 
resulting in copulation attempts that serve 
to pollinate its flowers. Imitation of actions is 
less well understood.
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sooner than it otherwise might. If that 
brings success the animal will often 
learn to use these actions again. 
A tendency to copy — whether 
described as imitation, response 
facilitation or priming — can therefore 
accelerate learning, and indeed such 
benefits may have contributed to the 
evolution of response facilitation in 
some species. But the learning itself 
is consequent on getting a favourable 
result: reinforced trial-and-error 
learning, in behaviourist jargon. Most 
experimental tests of animal imitation 
can be explained in this way, because 
the experimenters presented the task 
immediately after the subjects had 
observed a skilled performer, with 
rewards contingent on success.
Learning by imitation can be shown 
by introducing a delay before testing, 
as has been done successfully with 
both quail and budgerigars. In these 
cases, the animal evidently learnt to 
link an action in its repertoire — for 
example, pulling, pecking or 
stepping — with a particular task, 
by seeing it used. This has been 
described as contextual imitation, 
because what the animal learns is 
when and where to apply an existing 
behavioural tactic in its repertoire [2].
The Holy Grail of animal imitation 
studies, however, is to discover a 
species that is capable of learning 
a new skill by observation. Another 
species, that is: there is no doubt 
that humans can learn in this way, 
even though in western cultures it 
is now more common to acquire 
new skills with some form of verbal 
instruction. Examples of human skills 
that seem particularly dependent 
on learning by imitation are sushi-
making, blacksmithing, and stone-
working by medieval masons. In a 
more mundane context, most of us 
have watched an expert take apart 
a machine — perhaps a mechanic 
helping us fix our automobile — and 
come away knowing, however 
imperfectly, how to do it ourselves 
next time. This kind of imitation, called 
production-imitation, involves an 
individual constructing a behavioural 
routine new to it, out of components 
in its pre-existing repertoire, from 
watching a more expert model [2,6]. 
Of course, it is unlikely that an entirely 
novel task will be mastered in a single 
viewing without practice or relevant 
prior experience; but crucially, 
production- imitation allows some 
part or outline of the task to be put 
together from observation before ever 
trying it out. 
Cognitively, the requirements 
for imitating a good example are 
quite different to those cases 
where the function is to resemble 
another individual or give out a 
social message [6]. Fine detail is 
unimportant as long as the right 
result is obtained, and indeed it is 
likely that details are better acquired 
by individual experience. A child, for 
instance, cannot copy the precise 
way her mother operates on objects, 
as she has smaller hands and less 
strength: precise copying of every 
action would be maladaptive. 
Moreover, the potential benefits of 
learning by imitation vary with task 
difficulty: where complexity is low, 
purely individual learning is to be 
expected, avoiding the costs of 
finding and watching a skilled model. 
It is therefore in learning the most 
technically complex and involved 
tasks that imitation should pay. 
Complex skills cannot be assembled 
Figure 2. A mountain gorilla deals with a spiny thistle. 
The elaborate food-processing skills of great apes depend on natural abilities, including indi-
vidual digit control, bimanual coordination, and a tendency to explore and play with objects. 
But imitation of the organizational structure or ‘gist’ of the process used by skilled adults al-
lows efficient guidance of learning, and the learned manual skills of apes are uniquely complex 
among non-humans.
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expect acquisition to be hierarchical, 
progressively building up larger 
and larger components. That is 
true whatever learning mechanism 
is involved, but if the gist of the 
right approach can be discerned by 
imitation, learning can progress 
by organizational leaps rather than 
by plodding acquisition of actions 
in sequence. Observational learning 
of the organizational gist of a task 
has been termed ‘program-level 
imitation’ [6].
Program-level imitation is nicely 
illustrated when a child copies a 
word she has not heard before. The 
child’s sound pattern is typically quite 
different to that of the adult model, 
with much higher-pitched vowels 
and often systematic simplification 
of consonant clusters. This shows 
that what is copied is the program-
level gist of the word, a new way to 
assemble the motor programs for 
producing vowels and consonants — 
which are already in the child’s 
repertoire. Crucially, this process of 
synthesis depends on prior analysis 
that parses the adult’s sound into its 
component units. Compare this with 
the same word imitated by a myna 
bird: the resulting sound pattern is 
so close to the human model that 
it can be hard to tell them apart 
spectrographically. Because the 
vocal apparatus of the bird is quite 
different, a double syrinx rather than 
a single larynx, it is clear that the bird 
matches the audible result rather 
than the organization of behaviour.
Copying of results rather than 
actions, termed emulation learning, 
has sometimes been considered 
‘simpler’ for animals than imitation 
and assumed to underlie animal 
behaviour that appears imitative. 
The evidence from child psychology, 
however, suggests the reverse 
when it comes to practical tasks 
with objects: extensive evidence 
exists for early child imitation, but 
none for effective emulation prior to 
4–5 years. This perspective makes 
especially remarkable some of the 
emulation noted in cetaceans: for 
instance, a bottlenose dolphin calf 
in an aquarium, teased by a visitor 
blowing smoke at the glass, went to 
its mother to suck milk, then returned 
to the visitor and blew a cloud of milk 
towards him, like smoke!
Unsurprisingly, the strongest 
evidence for program-level 
imitation in animals comes from the 
technically complex achievements 
of the great apes (Figure 2). 
Chimpanzees in northern Congo 
regularly make two different types 
of tool in advance of arriving at sites 
where subterranean termites can be 
found. A sturdy rod is used to punch 
a hole deep enough to reach the 
termites, then a more delicate probe 
is used to agitate the termites, which 
bite onto the stem and can thus 
be fished out [7]. Rwandan gorillas 
regularly process a local species of 
stinging nettle: stripping up stems 
to detach the leaves, twisting off 
the petioles, sometimes repeating 
both these steps several times to 
accumulate a larger handful, then 
pulling up the leaf-bundle and folding 
it over the thumb, finally re-grasping 
the package before ingestion. 
In both chimpanzee and gorilla 
examples, the actions used at each 
processing stage are highly specific, 
and it is very improbable that each 
single individual could invent the 
appropriate process without some 
information from an expert model. 
Great apes that live with people 
copy human actions, sometimes 
remarkably complex ones. One 
orangutan was noted pushing 
glowing embers together, fanning 
the embers with a flat plate, 
decanting kerosene into a container 
and putting it on glowing embers — 
fortunately, not completely efficiently 
or the jungle camp might have burnt 
down [8].
In all these cases, the individuals 
concerned had prolonged opportunity 
for casual observation of skilled 
models, and their imitative ability 
can be explained by a perceptual 
process, behaviour parsing, which 
detects the statistical regularities of 
complex but repeated behaviour [9]. 
Imitation by behaviour parsing 
is presumably part of the human 
repertoire, too, but human children 
go beyond this relatively unselective 
process when they imitate. Eighteen-
month-old infants, when shown how 
to turn on a light by an adult who 
leans forward to press the switch 
with their forehead, often copy the 
whole performance — even though 
they could use a hand more easily. 
But when researchers modified the 
task so that the adult was holding 
a cloak around their shoulders, 
infants never copied the use of the 
forehead [10]. Apparently, in some 
way the infant is able to compute 
that forehead is only needed 
because hands are occupied, and 
can therefore be ignored. Something 
similar to this ‘rational imitation’ 
has been seen in chimpanzees, 
presented with a demonstration 
of how to get food from a puzzle 
box [11]. When the box is opaque, 
the apes copy both actions used 
by the experimenter; but when it is 
transparent, thus revealing that the 
first action makes no contact with 
the food, they ignore it. 
It is not yet clear whether 
chimpanzees will indeed prove to 
show rational cause-and-effect 
understanding of what they imitate, 
or whether simpler explanations such 
as behaviour parsing will suffice. But 
a recurring theme in this article has 
been the intriguing behaviour of great 
apes (and occasionally cetaceans), 
that has repeatedly led researchers 
to suspect cognitively complex 
explanations. In contrast, imitation 
of actions is widespread and 
biologically important among other 
taxa, but the cognitive mechanism 
of these cases is relatively 
straightforward to understand.
References
 1.  Hoppitt, W., Blackburn, L., and Laland, K.N. 
(2007). Response facilitation in the domestic 
fowl. Anim. Behav. 73, 229–238.
 2.  Byrne, R.W. (2002). Imitation of novel complex 
actions: What does the evidence from animals 
mean? Adv. Stud. Behav. 31, 77–105.
 3.  Laland, K.N. (2008). Animal cultures. Curr. Biol. 
18, R366–R370.
 4.  Meltzoff, A.N. and Prinz, W. eds. (2002). The 
Imitative Mind: Development, Evolution, 
and Brain Bases. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press).
 5.  Frith, C., and Frith, U. (2005). Theory of mind. 
Curr. Biol. 15, R655–R645.
 6.  Byrne, R.W., and Russon, A. (1998). Learning 
by imitation: a hierarchical approach. Behav. 
Brain Sci. 21, 667–721.
 7.  Sanz, C.M., and Morgan, D.B. (2007). 
Chimpanzee tool technology in the Goualougo 
Triangle, Republic of Congo. J. Hum. Evol. 52, 
420–433.
 8.  Russon, A.E., and Galdikas, B.M.F. (1993). 
Imitation in free-ranging rehabilitant 
orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). J. Comp. 
Psychol. 107, 147–161.
 9.  Byrne, R.W. (2003). Imitation as behaviour 
parsing. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B 358, 
529–536.
 10.  Gergely, G., Bekkering, H., and Király, I. (2002). 
Rational imitation in preverbal infants. Nature 
415, 755.
 11.  Horner, V., and Whiten, A. (2005). Causal 
knowledge and imitation/emulation switching 
in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and children 
(Homo sapiens). Anim. Cogn. 8, 164–181.
Scottish Primate Research Group, and 
Centre for Social Learning and Cognitive 
Evolution, School of Psychology, University 
of St. Andrews, Fife KY16 9JP, Scotland, UK. 
E-mail: rwb@st-andrews.ac.uk
